Saturday 14 March 2015

गैंगस्टर महादेव महार हत्याकांड फैसला (क्र. 41 से 50)

 

41. इसी प्रकार माननीय आंध्रप्रदेश उच्च न्यायालय ने न्यायदृष्टांत In GURUVINDAPALLI ANNA RAO VS. STATE OF A.P. [2003 CRI.L.J. 3253],  ने यह अभिनिर्धारित किया है कि:-
that since the previous statement of a witness under Section 164 Cr.P.C., has been recorded by a Magistrate, it is a public document, the Magistrate need not be summoned and examined as a witness.
माननीय आंध्रप्रदेश उच्च न्यायालय ने अपने निर्णय के पैरा 7 में यह अवलोकित किया है कि:-
"7.We would like to put one more discrepancy on record, viz., that while recording evidence, the learned II Additional Sessions Judge had summoned the I Additional Munsif Magistrate, Tenali (PW.10) to prove the statement of P.W.1 recorded by him under Section 164 Cr.P.C. This Court has already ruled if any Magistrate records the statement of a witness under Section 164 Cr.P.C, it is not necessary for the Sessions Judges to summon that Magistrate to prove the contents of the statement recorded by him. This Court has already ruled that when a Magistrate, discharging his official functions as such, records the statement of any witness under Section 164 Cr.P.C, such statement is a 'public document' and it does not require any formal proof. Moreover, it is seen that the learned II Additional Sessions Judge, Guntur, while recording the evidence of the I Additional Munsif Magistrate, Tenali (PW.10), has exhibited the statement of P.W.1 recorded by the Magistrate as Ex.P.10. As a matter of fact, such statement cannot be treated as a substantive piece of evidence. Such statement can be made use of by the prosecution for the purpose of corroboration, or by the defence for contradiction, under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, the II Additional Sessions Judge, Guntur, is directed to note the provisions contained in Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Even if a statement is recorded by a Magistrate, it is not a substantive piece of evidence, but it is only a previous statement."
इसी प्रकार माननीय इलाहाबाद उच्च न्यायालय ने न्यायदृष्टांत RAM LAKHAN SHEO CHARAN AND OTHERS VS. STATE OF U.P. [1991 CRI.L.J. 2790]  में ऐसी स्थिति में जबकि कोई साक्षी अपने साक्ष्य में दं0प्र0सं0 की धारा 164 के कथन से मुकर जाता है, तब यह अभिनिर्धारित किया है कि:-
"12.The trial was held when the new Code of Criminal Procedure had come into force. The wordings of Section 164 in the new and old Code of Criminal Procedure with little changes are the same. As early as in Manik Gazi v. Emperor, AIR 1942 Cal 36 : (1942) 43 Cri LJ 277 a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had held that the statements Under Section 164 of the Code can be used only to corroborate or contradict the statements made Under Sections 145 and 157 of the Indian Evidence Act. In Brij Bhushan Singh Vs. Emperor, AIR 1946 PC 38 and in Mamand v. Emperor, AIR 1946 PC 45 : (1946) 47 Cri LJ 344) the Privy Council had observed that the statement Under Section 164 of the Code cannot be used as a substantive evidence and which can only be used to contradict and corroborate the statement of a witness given in the Court. Similar observations, as made in the two cases below, were made by the Privy Council, in Bhuboni Sahu v. King, AIR 1949 PC 257 : (1949) 50 Cri LJ 872) and in Bhagi v. Crown, 1950 Cri LJ 1004 : (AIR (37) 1950 HP 35). It was also held by a single Bench of the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Commissioner's court that statement Under Section 164 of Code cannot be used as a substantive piece of evidence. In State v. Hotey Khan, 1960 ALJ 642 : (1960 Cri LJ 1167). A division Bench of this Court had also observed that statements Under Section 164 of the Code cannot be used as a substantive evidence.
अतः माननीय उच्चतम एवं उच्च न्यायालय के उक्त न्यायदृष्टांतों में अभिनिर्धारित की गयी विधि से प्रश्न क्रमांक 1 और 2 का यह उत्तर है कि इस प्रकरण में भी जो साक्षी दं0प्र0सं0 की धारा 164 के कथन से न्यायालय में मुकर गये हैं, उनके दं0प्र0सं0 की धारा 164 के कथन के आधार पर आरोपीगण की दोषसिद्धी नही की जा सकती है। लेकिन जिन साक्षियों ने न्यायालय में दं0प्र0सं0 की धारा 164 के कथनों की पुष्टि अपने साक्ष्य में की है, तब दं0प्र0सं0 की धारा 164 के तहत किये गये कथन का प्रयोग साक्षियों के साक्ष्य में किये गये कथनों के समर्थन में भी किया जा सकता है।
विधिक प्रश्न क्रमांक 3 का उत्तर
43- जहां तक पक्षद्रोही साक्षियों के साक्ष्य में किये गये कथनों की ग्राह्यता का प्रश्न है तो इस संबंध में माननीय उच्चतम न्यायालय के निम्नलिखित न्यायदृष्टांत अवलोकनीय है:-
1- STATE OF U.P. VS. RAMESH PRASAD MISRA [1996 (10) SCC 360], that evidence of a hostile witness would not be totally rejected if spoken in favour of the prosecution or accused. But, it requires to be subjected to close scrutiny and that portion of evidence which is consistent with the
case of the prosecution or defence can be relied upon.
2- Balu Sonba Shinde v. State of Maharashtra [2002 (7) SCC 543], Gagan Kanojia v. State of Punjab [2006 (13) SCC 516]; Radha Mohan Singh v. State of U.P.[2006 (2) SCC 450], Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh[2007 (13) SCC 360] and Subbu Singh v. State[2009 (6) SCC 462].
83. Thus, the law can be summarised to the effect that the evidence of a hostile witness cannot be discarded as a whole, and relevant parts thereof which are admissible in law, can be used by the prosecution or the defence.
3-इस संबंध में माननीय उच्चतम न्यायालय के न्यायदृष्टांत C. Muniappan v. State of T.N.[2010 (9) SCC 567] (SCC p. 596, para 83) and Himanshu v. State (NCT of Delhi)[(2011 (2) SCC 36.]" भी अवलोकनीय है।
विधिक प्रश्न क्रमांक 4 का उत्तर
44- अब प्रश्न यह उत्पन्न होता है कि यदि कोई साक्षी अपने मुख्य परीक्षण में किये गये कथनों को मुख्य परीक्षण के बाद हुये प्रतिपरीक्षण में अस्वीकार कर देता है तो क्या उसके मुख्य परीक्षण में किये गये कथनों का अवलम्ब अभियोजन के समर्थन में लिया जा सकता है। इस प्रश्न का उत्तर माननीय उच्चतम न्यायालय ने क्रिमनल अपील क्रमांक 554/12 ‘‘विनोद कुमार बनाम पंजाब राज्य‘‘ निर्णय दिनांक 21 जनवरी 2015 में दिया है। यह न्यायदृष्टांत भ्रष्टाचार अधिनियम से संबंधित अपराध से संबंधित है। इस न्यायदृष्टांत में अ0सा05 शिकायतकर्ता था, जो साक्ष्य में पूर्णतः पक्षद्रोही हो गया। अ0सा07 जगदीश वर्मा ने अपने मुख्यपरीक्षण में अभियोजन के मामले का पूर्णतया समर्थन किया लेकिन प्रतिपरीक्षण में उसने मुख्यपरीक्षण में किये गये कथनों से मुकर गया। अ0सा01 एवं अ0सा04 औपचारिक साक्षी थे, अ0सा08 पुलिस अधिकारी था, जिसने रेड की थी। तब विचारण न्यायालय एवं माननीय पंजाब एवं हरियाणा उच्च न्यायालय ने प्रार्थी एवं अ0सा07 जगदीश वर्मा के पक्षद्रोही होने के बाद भी आरोपी को दोषसिद्ध किया था, जिसे माननीय उच्चतम न्यायालय में प्रश्नाकिंत किया गया था। तब माननीय उच्चतम न्यायालय ने विचारण न्यायालय द्वारा की गयी दोषसिद्धी को स्थिर रखते हुये अपने निर्णय के पैरा 40 के प्रथम भाग में यह अवलोकित किया कि:-
40. Reading the evidence in entirety, his evidence  cannot be brushed aside. The delay in cross- examination has resulted in his pre-varication from the examination-in-chief. But, a significant one, his examination-in-chief and the re-examination impels us to accept the testimony that he had gone into the octroi post and had witnessed about the demand and acceptance of money by the accused. In his cross- examination he has stated that he had not gone with Baj Singh to the vigilance department at any time and no recovery was made in his presence. The said part of the testimony, in our considered view, does not commend acceptance in the backdrop of entire evidence in examination-in-chief and the re-examination. The evidence of PW6 and PW7 have got corroboration from PW8. He in all material particulars has stated about the documents recovery and proven pertaining the phenolphthalein powder. 
45- इस संबंध में माननीय उच्चतम न्यायालय के न्यायदृष्टांत रमेशभाई मोहनभाई कोली बनाम स्टेट आफ गुजरात पेज 442 के पैरा 7 और 8 में माननीय उच्चतम न्यायालय ने यह अवलोकित किया है कि:-
7. In the instant case, all the eye-witnesses examined on the prosecution side have en bloc turned hostile due to influence and pressure of the accused persons which included a sitting MLA of the ruling party. This aspect has been analyzed by the trial Court while convicting and awarding sentence on the accused/appellants. This Court has noted and observed in a large number of cases that witnesses may lie but circumstances do not. On going through the entire materials, particularly, the chain of circumstances, we are satisfied that the prosecution has been successful in bringing home the guilt of the appellants herein for the commission of murder of Prakashbhai Raveshia and the eye-witnesses turning hostile, do not, in any manner, crate a dent in the case of the prosecution.
8.It is settled legal proposition that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examine him. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent that their version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof. (vide Bhagwan Singh v. The State of Haryana, AIR 1976 SC 202; Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa, AIR 1977 SC 170; Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1848 and Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 1853. -
46- इस संबंध में माननीय उच्चतम न्यायालय का न्यायदृष्टांत स्टेट आफ एम.पी. बनाम बद्री यादव एवं अन्य 2006 क्रिमनल लॉ जर्नल 2128 के पैरा 5 से 11 अवलोकनीय है:-
5. The facts of this case illustrate a disquieting feature as to how the High Court has committed a grave miscarriage of justice in recording the acquittal of the respondents.
6. Few dates wouldsuffice. PW-8 Mohd. Amin and P.W.9 Zakir Ali's statements were recorded under Section 164, Cr. P.C. before the Magistrate on 21-9-1989. On 18-12-1990 their statements on oath were recorded before the Trial Court as prosecution witnesses.
7. It appears that PW-8 and PW-9 filed an affidavit on 16-8-1994 that the statements made before the Magistrate by them were under pressure, tutored by police of Madhav Nagar and due to their pressure the statements were recorded. It was further stated that the policemen threatened them that if they did not make statements as tutored by the police they would implicate PW-8 and PW-9 in this case and when the statements were recorded before the Magistrate the policemen were standing outside and, therefore, the statements were made as tutored by the police and due to threat and coercion. By this affidavit they have completely resiled from their previous statements recorded before the court as prosecution witnesses. They further stated that they did not see any marpeet and who had inflicted injuries. They further denied that they did not see any incident at all nor any person. Though the affidavit appeared to be dated 16-8-1994, it was actually signed by both on 17-8-1994.
8. In the affidavit of Zakir Ali PW-9 dated 17-8-1994 it is also stated that his statement was recorded on 18-12-1990 before the Sessions Judge. The affidavit further stated that the statement recorded on 18-12-1990 was made due to threat and under the pressure of police. It is further stated that the applicant was going for Haj and according to the religious rites, he wanted to bid good-bye to all the sins he had committed. It is further stated that the statements he made before the Court of Magistrate and before the Sessions Judge were false. It is unfortunate that the said application was allowed by the Sessions Judge on 9-2-1995 and they were allowed to be examined as defence witnesses juxtaposed as DW-1 and DW-2. The Sessions Judge, however, on examining the credibility of PW-8 and PW-9 juxtaposed as DW-1 and DW- 2 rejected it as not trustworthy, in our view rightly.
9. The Sessions Judge came to a finding that the statements of DW-1 and DW-2 were recorded under Section 164, Cr. P.C. before the Magistrate on 21-9-1989 as PW-8 and PW-9. Thereafter, their statements were recorded before the Sessions Judge on 18-12-1990 and after four years on 17-7-1995 they gave a different version resiling from their previous statements on grounds of threat, coercion and being tutored by the police. It will be noticed that in between 18-12-1990 the day on which their statements were recorded before the Sessions Judge as PWs and their statements as defence witnesses which were recorded on 17-7-1995 as DWs, no complaint whatsoever was made by DW-1 and DW-2 to any Court or to any authority that they gave statements on 18-12-1990 due to coercion, threat or being tutored by the police. This itself could have been a sufficient circumstance to disbelieve the subsequent statements as DW-1 and DW-2 as held by the Sessions Judge, in our view, rightly.
10. The High Court, while reversing the order of conviction recorded by the Sessions Judge gave the following reasons in support of the reversal in paragraph 16 as under: -
"This case has focused a very strange phenomenon before us. The witnesses were examined initially as prosecution witnesses. The trial was not completed within short span of time. It lingered on for about five years. After lapse of five years these witnesses stated in favour of the accused and against the prosecution. The question arises whether the prosecutor in charge of the prosecution was vigilant enough to see that all prosecution witnesses are examined within reasonable time span, so as to see that the case is completed within that time span. The question arises whether the court was vigilant enough to see that the trial is conducted day-by- day system. The both answers would be negative. Unfortunately, the Sessions Trial was not conducted day- by-day. The prosecution witnesses were not produced by making them to remain present for day-by-day trial. The adjournments were sought by defence and they were also granted liberally. All this resulted in strange situation where those two witnesses stated something as prosecution witnesses and after lapse of sufficient time, they appeared before the court and gave the evidence as defence witnesses and stated against the prosecution."
11. In our view, the reasoning recorded by the High Court, itself would have been sufficient to reject the testimony of DW-1 and DW-2. However, having said so the High Court reversed the order of conviction and recorded the order of acquittal, which is perverse.
47- इस संबंध में माननीय उच्चतम न्यायालय के न्यायदृष्टांत गुड्डराम बनाम स्टेट आफ हिमाचल प्रदश 2013 क्रिमनल लॉ जर्नल पेज क्रमांक 481 का पैरा 22, 23 अवलोकनीय है, जिसमें एकमात्र प्रत्यक्षदर्शी साक्षी पक्षद्राही हो गया था और उसने अपने मुख्यपरीक्षण में घटना को देखना बताया है और प्रतिपरीक्षण में पक्षद्रोही होते हुये यह कहा कि वह पांच फीट गढ्ढे में गिर गया था, उसने आरोपी गुड्डू को मृतक दिलीप सिंह को चोट पहुंचाते नही देखा। तब माननीय उच्चतम न्यायालय ने घटना के प्रत्यक्षदर्शी साक्षी के मुख्य परीक्षण के कथन एवं प्रतिपरीक्षण के कथन का उल्लेख पैरा 22 में करते हुये पैरा 23 में यह उल्लेख किये थे कि पक्षद्रोही साक्षी के साक्ष्य को पूर्णतः अस्वीकार नही करना चाहिये। इस न्यायदृष्टांत में भी आरोपी की अपील को आंशिक रूप से स्वीकार किया गया था।
48- इसी प्रकार न्यायदृष्टांत निसार खान उर्फ गुड्डू बनाम स्टेट आफ उत्तरांचल 2006- LAW (SC) -1-57  में भी परीक्षण प्रतिपरीक्षण के एक वर्ष बाद आरोपीगण द्वारा साक्षी को विनओवर करके अपने पक्ष में कथन दिलवाये थे। इस न्यायदृष्टांत में अभियोजन साक्षी क्रमांक 1 और 2 प्रत्यक्षदर्शी साक्षी थे, जिन्हें परीक्षण प्रतिपरीक्षण कर दिनांक 4/1/2001 को उन्मुक्त कर दिया गया था, वे पुनः दिनांक 7/1/2002 को बुलाये गये, उनका पुनः प्रति परीक्षण आरोपीगण द्वारा किया गया, तब वे पक्षद्रोही हो गये एवं अपने पूर्व में किये गये कथनों को अस्वीकार कर दिये। तब माननीय उच्चतम न्यायालय ने अपने निर्णय के पैरा 9 में यह उल्लेख किया था कि:-
It clearly appears that the eye-witnesses were won over by threat or intimidation after more than 1 year of there examination and cross examination and ultimately when the eye-witnesses were won over by the accused they were recalled and re- examined on 7-1-2002 --------------- Naturally, by the time the eye-witnesses were recalled they were  won over either by money, by muscle power by threats or intimidation 
49- इसी प्रकार माननीय उच्चतम न्यायालय के न्यायदृष्टांत अकील उर्फ जावेद बनाम स्टेट आफ एन.सी.टी. आफ देहली (2013) क्रिमनल लॉ जर्नल पेज क्र0 571 में भी साक्षी अ0सा020 का प्रतिपरीक्षण दिनांक 18/9/2000 को स्थगित किया गया था, उसके बाद अ0सा020 का प्रतिपरीक्षण दिनांक 18/11/2000 को हुआ। तब अपने प्रतिपरीक्षण में अ0सा020 पक्षद्रोही हो गयी और कहा कि उसने अपीलार्थी/आरोपी को इंस्पेक्टर राजेन्द्र गौतम के कहने से पहचाना था, जो मुख्य परीक्षण के दिन उससे मिले थे। तब माननीय उच्चतम न्यायालय के समक्ष यह तर्क प्रस्तुत किया गया कि न्यायालय के समक्ष कोई भी स्वीकार करने वाला विधिक साक्ष्य नही है। इस न्यायदृष्टांत में माननीय उच्चतम न्यायालय ने भी अ0सा020 के मुख्यपरीक्षण पर विश्वास किया था।
50- इसी प्रकार माननीय उच्चतम न्यायालय ने याकूब इस्माईल भाई पटेल विरूद्ध स्टेट आफ गुजरात एआईआर 2004 एससी 4209 के पैरा 37, 40 एवं 41 अवलोकनीय है, जो इस प्रकार है:-
37.The testimony of PW-2, in our view, is wholly believable and worthy of inspiring confidence but is also sufficient by itself to prove the case against the appellant and that the credibility of this witness has not been impaired in the cross-examination by the appellant. This witness has stuck to his police statement and the subsequent examination-in-chief in Court where he identified the appellant accused as well as the co-accused as the assailants of the deceased. This deposition, in our view, proved the intention of the accused to cause the  death of the deceased inasmuch as he deposes that the  assault was directed at the neck of the deceased. It is also  not the case of the appellant that this witness was  inimical to the appellant or that there was a reason for  PW-2 to implicate the appellants falsely. The factum of  his friendship with the deceased does not reduce PW-2 to the position of being an interested witness. 40.Significantly this witness, later on filed an affidavit  wherein he had sworn to the fact that whatever he had  deposed before Court as PW-1 was not true and it was so  done at the instance of Police. 41.The averments in the affidavits are rightly rejected by  the High Court and also the Sessions Court. Once the  witness is examined as a prosecution witness, he cannot  be allowed to perjure himself by resiling from testimony  given in Court on oath. It is pertinent to note that during  the intervening period between giving of evidence as PW-1 and filing of affidavit in Court later he was in jail in a narcotic case and that the accused persons were also fellow inmates there. 
अतः स्पष्ट है कि इस प्रकरण में विधिक प्रश्न क्रमांक 4 का उत्तर यह है कि यदि कोई साक्षी अपने मुख्य परीक्षण में किये गये कथनों का कतिपय अंतराल के बाद प्रतिपरीक्षण किये जाने पर, मुख्य परीक्षण के कथनों से मुकर जाता है, तो ऐसे साक्षी के मुख्य परीक्षण में किये गये कथनों की सुक्ष्म एवं सावधानीपूर्वक विवेचना के पश्चात विश्वास किया जा सकता है। 

No comments:
Write comments

महत्वपूर्ण सूचना- इस ब्लॉग में उपलब्ध जिला न्यायालयों के न्याय निर्णय https://services.ecourts.gov.in से ली गई है। पीडीएफ रूप में उपलब्ध निर्णयों को रूपांतरित कर टेक्स्ट डेटा बनाने में पूरी सावधानी बरती गई है, फिर भी ब्लॉग मॉडरेटर पाठकों से यह अनुरोध करता है कि इस ब्लॉग में प्रकाशित न्याय निर्णयों की मूल प्रति को ही संदर्भ के रूप में स्वीकार करें। यहां उपलब्ध समस्त सामग्री बहुजन हिताय के उद्देश्य से ज्ञान के प्रसार हेतु प्रकाशित किया गया है जिसका कोई व्यावसायिक उद्देश्य नहीं है।
इस ब्लॉग की सामग्री का किसी भी कानूनी उद्देश्यों के लिए उपयोग नहीं किया जाना चाहिए। हमने सामग्री की सटीकता, पूर्णता, उपयोगिता या अन्यथा के संबंध में कोई ज़िम्मेदारी स्वीकार नहीं की है। उपयोगकर्ताओं को सलाह दी जाती है कि वे इस वेबसाइट पर दी गई जानकारी पर कार्य करने से पहले किसी भी जानकारी को सत्यापित / जांचें और किसी भी उचित पेशेवर से सलाह प्राप्त करें।

Category

03 A Explosive Substances Act 149 IPC 295 (a) IPC 302 IPC 304 IPC 307 IPC 34 IPC 354 (3) IPC 399 IPC. 201 IPC 402 IPC 428 IPC 437 IPC 498 (a) IPC 66 IT Act Aanand Math Abhishek Vaishnav Ajay Sahu Ajeet Kumar Rajbhanu Anticipatory bail Arun Thakur Awdhesh Singh Bail CGPSC Chaman Lal Sinha Civil Appeal D.K.Vaidya Dallirajhara Durg H.K.Tiwari HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH Kauhi Lalit Joshi Mandir Trust Motor accident claim News Patan Rajkumar Rastogi Ravi Sharma Ravindra Singh Ravishankar Singh Sarvarakar SC Shantanu Kumar Deshlahare Shayara Bano Smita Ratnavat Temporary injunction Varsha Dongre VHP अजीत कुमार राजभानू अनिल पिल्लई आदेश-41 नियम-01 आनंद प्रकाश दीक्षित आयुध अधिनियम ऋषि कुमार बर्मन एस.के.फरहान एस.के.शर्मा कु.संघपुष्पा भतपहरी छ.ग.टोनही प्रताड़ना निवारण अधिनियम छत्‍तीसगढ़ राज्‍य विधिक सेवा प्राधिकरण जितेन्द्र कुमार जैन डी.एस.राजपूत दंतेवाड़ा दिलीप सुखदेव दुर्ग न्‍यायालय देवा देवांगन नीलम चंद सांखला पंकज कुमार जैन पी. रविन्दर बाबू प्रफुल्ल सोनवानी प्रशान्त बाजपेयी बृजेन्द्र कुमार शास्त्री भ्रष्टाचार निवारण अधिनियम मुकेश गुप्ता मोटर दुर्घटना दावा राजेश श्रीवास्तव रायपुर रेवा खरे श्री एम.के. खान संतोष वर्मा संतोष शर्मा सत्‍येन्‍द्र कुमार साहू सरल कानूनी शिक्षा सुदर्शन महलवार स्थायी निषेधाज्ञा स्मिता रत्नावत हरे कृष्ण तिवारी